To my knowledge, and I’ve enquired around the Marine Corps through friends, the USMC’s AAVs left Iraq in late 2005 and 2006 after 14 Marines and one interpreter from 3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment were killed in action in the vicinity of Haditha, Iraq in an AAV on August 1, 2005.

Why is this fleet of vehicles, that has not been involved in “combat operations” in almost 14 years in such bad material condition?  It is certainly not because... as Marine Corps MajGen Greg Olson stated this past Monday to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness  — “…20 years of landborne operations have caused us to lose some of our amphibious edge.” So why?


  1. What did the unit readiness reports say that were submitted to the 1st Marine Division?  If those were inaccurate, then commanding officers should be help responsible.
  2. Is this a “safety” problem, is this a “leadership” problem or is it an “operational discipline” problem… or a combination of all three?

The USMC has been doing waterborne operations since 1972 with the AAV, anyone suggesting that we need NEW safety procedures might be well advised to do some reading — NO AMOUNT OF INSTRUCTION OR PAPER CAN FIX AN UNDISCIPLINED ORGANIZATION.